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State Blue Sky Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations
By JOHN G. SOBIESKI*
IN Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski,' the California District Court
of Appeal held that the California Commissioner of Corporations had
jurisdiction under the California Blue Sky Law2 over the proposal of
that Delaware corporation to change the voting rights on its shares to
eliminate cumulative voting for the election of its directors. Although
the California Supreme Court denied the company's petition for a hear-
ing,' the case has been the subject of comment.4 Because of the interest
which this case has aroused, this article will discuss the general subject
of state Blue Sky jurisdiction over foreign corporations, of which subject
this case is but a part,5 and comment briefly on cumulative voting.
Two types of laws-general corporation laws under which cor-
porations are chartered, and Blue Sky laws, which regulate the "sale"
of corporate securities-are involved in a consideration of state Blue
Sky jurisdiction. Since, as Justice Holmes noted, the life of the law has
been experience rather than logic, a brief review of items of past expe-
rience in this area may help put the subject in focus.
Blackstone stated that the king's consent was "absolutely necessary"
to the creation of a corporation.6 Early state legislatures, therefore,
followed the practice of incorporation by special act. Although this gave
*Commissioner of Corporations, State of California.
1191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
"CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-26104. Its technical name is the Corporate Securities Law
though it also applies to securities of non-corporate issuers. The article refers to it as the
Blue Sky Law because that is the name under which such statutes are usually known in
the United States.
Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 415, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 729
(1961). Except in murder cases the California Supreme Court generally exercises a dis-
cretiopary jurisdiction. CAL. CoNsr. art VI, § 4.
' E.g., 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 242 (1962) ; 46 MiNN. L. REV. 785 (1962) ; Hill, Some Com-
ments on the Uniform Securities Act, Nw.U.L. Rev. 680 (1961).
'In Western, Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski the plaintiff was but a "pseudo-foreign" corpo-
ration. Its business headquarters have always been in Los Angeles, California, from whence
its air routes radiate; most of its employees reside in California; most of its shares are be-
lieved to be held by Californians, and its shareholders' meetings have generally been held
there. It does no business in Delaware. Delaware's contact apparently consists in the fee it
gets for the corporate charter.
'I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 472.
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some legislative scrutiny to the proposed corporate activity, it appar-
ently also caused angry charges of monopoly and favoritism. The conse-
quence was the general incorporation laws of the early 19th century,
opening corporate opportunity to all. They "sprinkled holy water on
corporations" and are "a direct legacy from Jacksonian Democracy."'
The easy general incorporation laws (and the remarkable self-
restraint of some courts) resulted in some deplorable practices towards
investors 8 The view was also expressed that executives of corporations
were in a system which made it difficult for them to follow ordinary
standards of morality.9
The general incorporation laws, as judicially interpreted, were said
to permit the corporate management to have "as complete latitude and
as little liability as possible" and the shareholders to have "as little
power and as few enforceable rights as can conveniently be arranged."1
Commencing in 1910, so-called Blue Sky laws were enacted by many
states. Only Nevada and Delaware do not now have some form of a
Blue Sky law.1
In general, Blue Sky laws required clearance of each securities offer-
ing with a state official and compliance with statutory standards designed
to protect investors, a return to the individualized approach.
The purpose of the Blue Sky laws was ". . . (t) o protect the public
against the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based
upon them .. .which have no more basis than so many feet of blue
sky,"'1 2 and ". .. to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair
' SCHLESSINGER, JR., THE ACE OF JACKSON, 337 (1945).
' See, e.g., 1 MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 243-44 (1899) (humorous accounts of Mining
Swindles); 2 Mark Twain, supra at 17-19; 2 Mark Twain, supra at 136: "The bubble
scarcely left a microscopic moisture behind it"; SWANBERG, JIM FISK 25 (1959): "The
stock market at the time was an unregulated financial jungle ruled by the sharpest tooth
and claw."; Swanberg, supra at 86: "What the Tweed Ring was in government, the Erie
Ring was in finance."; Swanberg, supra at 71: "Without asking a by-your-leave from the
board of directors, Fisk and Gould secretly issued 235,000 shares of new (Erie) stock
.... "; Swanberg, supra at 89: they "classified the road's boards of directors into five
groups. . . . Its real intent was to keep Gould and Fisk at the helm for a full five years
...make it a more tractable creature for their Wall Street speculations."
'See, e.g., NORRIS, THE OCTOPUS, 285 (1901): "Blame conditions not men."; LEWIS,
THE BIG FOUR, 211 (1938), in which the railroad president who, among other things,
could travel from the Atlantic to the Pacific entirely on railroads he controlled was pub-
licly described as having "no more soul than a shark" . .. . "scrupulously dishonest"
"ruthless as a crocodile."
"o BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 138 (1932).
" LosS & COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW, 17 (1958). In 1931 Delaware enacted a rudi-
mentary Blue Sky Law. It was later repealed after Nevada "boasted" that Nevada was the
only state without a Blue Sky Law. See HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE 71-72
(1959).
1" Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550-551 (1917).
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chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate ventures."' 3
The Blue Sky laws were "a means to the same purpose made neces-
sary, it may be supposed, by the persistence of the evil and its insidious
forms and the experience of the inadequacy of penalties or other repres-
sive measures."' 4
The usual Blue Sky Law makes no express distinction between sales
of securities by foreign and by domestic corporations. 5 Should an
exception for sales of securities by foreign corporations be implied?
Such exception, if made, could apply to most securities offerings.
Certain corporations are in the business of arranging foreign (out of
state) incorporations for others. A lawyer can phone such a firm, de-
scribe what he wants, pay the fees, and a charter from any state, as
ordered, will usually be delivered in a day or so. The business of such
incorporating concerns is extensive. For example, one advertises that it
acts as Delaware agent for corporations whose total assets exceed
$100,000,000,000."6 If a foreign charter, so easily obtainable, auto-
matically granted an exception to the local Blue Sky law, the effective-
ness of the latter against "the evil and its insidious forms" could be
largely undermined.
A brief review of the laws, from the Blue Sky point of view, of
two of the states where foreign charters could be obtained, Nevada and
Delaware, will show the destructive effect which such exception could
have.
Since neither of those states has a Blue Sky law, there apparently is
no official scrutiny of the persons who are to be the corporate officers,
directors, or managers. Thus, there appears to be no Delaware or
Nevada procedure which would prevent notorious gangsters or convicted
swindlers, for example, from being officers or directors or in charge of
securities sales to the public by ventures incorporated in such states.
(Most Blue Sky administrators check the past records of all officers,
directors, and promoters as a matter of routine in acting on an applica-
tion for a permit to sell securities, and refuse to clear an issue if the
persons managing the company appear not to be of good business
reputation.)
Section 153 of the Delaware Corporation Law authorizes the issu-
ance of no-par shares "from time to time for such considerations as
" Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815, 361 P.2d 906, 912 (1961).
" Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 545 (1917). Their general validity is beyond
question. Caldwell v. Sioux Falls "Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917) ; Merrick v. Halsey, 242 U.S.
568 (1917).
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25500.
"THE CORPORATION TRUST Co., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW i (1960).
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fixed from time to time by the board of directors."' 7 Section 78.215 of
the Nevada Corporation Law is substantially the same. Such sections
would seem to authorize the issuance of shares "which have no more
basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'."
Last year, following a proxy fight, a new group got control of a
Delaware corporation which had many California shareholders. The
new directors then engaged in activities which caused some shareholders
to become restive and to commence organizing. The directors countered
this by passing a by-law which abolished the right of shareholders to
call special meetings of shareholders. Under this by-law even 100 per
cent of the shareholders could not call a special meeting. (Under Cali-
fornia law 20 per cent of the shareholders can always call a special
meeting."8 ) The law firm that represented the company reportedly ad-
vised that this by-law was legal under Delaware law. What is the
philosophy of a corporation law that would permit 100 per cent of the
shareholders to be stymied by their own directors? 9 This by-law was
voluntarily repealed by the board following a demand by the writer of
this article. The jurisdictional basis for this demand will be mentioned
later.
In another case, a Delaware corporation sought a California permit
to merge with its wholly owned subsidiary. The merger would eliminate
arrearages in cumulative dividends on the preferred shares by giving
additional new and different shares to the old preferred shareholders. -0
Counsel was asked what percentage of the preferred shares was required
under Delaware law to approve the merger. The reply was that the pre-
ferred and common shares voted as one class and a simple majority of
all votes was sufficient. Since the common shares were more numerous
than the preferred, did this mean that the common shares could, in
effect, decide whether or not the preferred would have their rights
changed? The reply was that such was the Delaware law and a letter
to that effect from a Delaware law firm was produced. Did dissenters
have appraisal rights? The reply was that, under the procedure proposed
to be followed, Delaware counsel advised that dissenters would have no
appraisal rights. Counsel was thereupon advised by this writer that if a
"It has been intimated that such shares may even be issued as a gift. See Speakman
v. Bernstein, 59 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1932).
"8 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2202.
1""[T]hose in charge of the corporation are merely agents of the stockholders, who
are the real owners of the property." Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 155 (1905).
"0 Although, under Delaware law, arrearages in cumulative dividends may not be abol-
ished by charter amendment, (Keller v. Wilson, 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 At. 115, (1936)) appar-
ently they can be wiped out in a merger. Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch.
318, 11 A.2d 331 (1940).
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California permit were to be obtained, the vote of the preferred shares
for the merger should be in percentages as great as those specified by
California law for California corporations; a procedure granting
appraisal rights to dissenters should be followed; the solicitation mate-
rial should advise shareholders of their appraisal rights and how to
exercise them if they chose to do so. The applicant appropriately
changed its procedure, made a fair offer, and secured a permit. (The
surviving corporation was a California corporation. This appears clearly
desirable when, as in this case, the business and shareholders are pri-
marily in California.)
Delaware or Nevada incorporation can also create dangerous prob-
lems for investors resulting from the mere fact of distance. Appraisal
rights exercisable only in Delaware, for example, may be of question-
able value to a California investor. Last year the management of a
Delaware corporation, on a Friday, mailed to its shareholders, most
of whom were Californians, a notice of a special shareholders meeting
to be held in Delaware a week from the following Monday. (The share-
holders' meetings had previously been held in California.) The meeting
was to act on a proposal to issue a large block of shares to a New York
corporation controlled by the management. Some California sharehold-
ers apparently received the notice of this Delaware meeting a week or
less before the special meeting was to be held. California stock brokers
thereupon requested the California Division of Corporations to take
action to protect the California investors. A nice question was presented.
Did the proposed transaction come within the jurisdiction of the Cali-
fornia Blue Sky Law? The reported view of the legal firm advising the
management was that it did not. (The company had previously applied
for a California permit for the issuance of such block of shares but had
failed to furnish information requested by the deputy commissioner
which would bear on the value of the property to be given in exchange
for the shares and the profits, if any, to insiders.) The company later
voluntarily postponed the meeting at the request of the writer of this
article and subsequently abandoned the possible conflict of interest
transaction. But if shareholders' rights are exercisable only at a distant
place, and possibly on very short notice they clearly are less effective
than if exercisable locally and upon reasonable notice. Promoters,
managements, and their counsel may sometimes be aware of this "ad-
vantage" of a foreign incorporation.
The above brief analysis of the Delaware and Nevada corporation
laws, which are much the same, appears sufficient to demonstrate that
they are designed primarily to please promoters and managements. Such
view is consistent with the substantial portion of the total revenues of
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
such states which are collected for incorporation services rendered to
companies which do no business there. It is the promoters and manage-
ments, not the shareholders, who ordinarily choose the state of incor-
poration."'
During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1961, approximately 17 per
cent of the total revenues of the State of Delaware were reportedly pro-
duced by corporation organization fees and franchise taxes22 and 5.88
per cent of Delaware's state revenues were reportedly collected from
race tracks2' which likewise reputedly cater mainly to non-residents.
Nevada, like Delaware, also seeks major contributions to its state
revenues from non-residents. Its famous "quickie" divorce law requires
a 60-day Nevada residence (with money necessarily spent in Nevada)
before the nuptial knot is legally snipped. For the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1961, permits and license fees on gambling (done mainly by
visitors) reportedly amounted to over 22 per cent of Nevada's total
revenues in fiscal 1961.24 Fees from corporations amounted to $409,304
or .87 per cent of total Nevada revenues.2"
Nevada officials reportedly toured the United States last year trying
to impress promoters and corporate officials with the desirability of
incorporating in Nevada. Nevada Governor Sawyer reportedly said that
this effort to secure more incorporations was for the purpose of lessen-
ing Nevada's economic dependency on gambling."
From the Blue Sky point of view, therefore, the fact that a corpora-
tion is incorporated in Delaware or Nevada is apparently no evidence
whatever that the sales of its securities elsewhere do not need Blue Sky
regulation. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the need for
Blue Sky regulation will ordinarily be most acute with respect to sales
of securities of corporations incorporated in Delaware or Nevada.
Since it appears necessary to the effectiveness of state Blue Sky law
regulation that it apply to sales in the state of securities of foreign
21 "Says the chairman of a small Southern California manufacturing company which
recently filed under the Nevada law: 'We plan mergers for the future, and the California
corporations commissioner makes you justify every move before letting you do anything
at all. We're more flexible under Nevada law.'" Wall St. Journal, June 1, 1961, p. 26,
col. 2 (Pac. Coast Ed.). The Wall St. Journal later kindly printed a statement by this
writer which said, in part: "If securities are to be sold in California a Nevada incorpora-
tion will grant no legal exemption under California law, particularly as to mergers which
cannot pass muster under an impartial inspection."
22 CCH STATE TAX CAS. REP., DEL. 186 (1962).
"CCH, op. cit. supra note 22, at 187.
', CCH, STATE TAX CAS. REP., NEV. 186 (1962).
25 Ibid.
" Wall St. Journal, June 1, 1961, p. 26, col. 3 (Pac. Coast Ed.).
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corporations, the question then arises whether there is any legal prin-
ciple which prevents a state from so protecting its citizens.
Although such state Blue Sky regulation may burden interstate
commerce, the courts have held such a burden to be merely incidental
to the valid exercise of state police power.27 Furthermore, in 1933 Con-
gress expressly acquiesced in state Blue Sky jurisdiction over securities
sales involving interstate commerce.
The ordinary doctrines of conflicts of laws likewise appear to be no
bar. The foreign corporation, by selling locally, thereby subjects itself
to the local Blue Sky Law.2' Furthermore, recent developments in this
area hold that a state's police power is not limited by mechanical con-
flict of laws concepts.3"
Recently there has been a tendency on the part of some states to de-
part from the general conflicts rule in order to take into account the
interests of the State having significant contact with the parties to the
litigation . . . . [S]ee the opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Vanston
Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161-162 . . .
where is it stated in context to a different but analagous problem:
"In determining which contact is the most significant in a particular
transaction, courts can seldom find a complete solution in the mechani-
cal formulae of the conflicts of law. Determination requires the exercise
of an informed judgment in the balancing of all the interests of the states
with the most significant contacts in order best to accommodate the
equities among the parties to the policies of those states."
If the state of incorporation is Nevada or Delaware, the "significant
contact" is ordinarily that of having got a fee for a charter. The
"significant contact" of the state with the Blue Sky law is ordinarily
the purchase of securities by its citizens. If we balance the interests
"to accommodate the equities" it is obvious that the right of the Blue
Sky law state to protect its citizens against imposition in the sale of
securities will necessarily prevail.
Even though the foreign state of incorporation should have a Blue
Sky law, such law would still not appear to give the foreign state the
most significant contact with respect to securities sold in another state.
The purpose of the Blue Sky laws is to protect investors. 31 The state
'7 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1917) ; Travellers v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643, 653 (1949) (concurring opinion). In Merrick v. Halsey, 242 U.S. 568 (1917), the
Michigan Blue Sky statute was upheld against attacks by Ohio and South Dakota concerns,
among others, who were affected by it.
" Securities Act of 1933, § 18, 48 Stat. 85, 15 U.S.C. § 77(n), 77(r) (1933). "Nothing in
this title shall affect the jurisdiction" of any state Blue Sky Commissioner.
'" See note 27 supra.
"0 Richards v. U.S., 369 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1962).
" See notes 12 and 13 supra.
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whose citizens are to pay their money clearly has the dominant contact
so far as the protection of those investors is concerned. The Richards
case makes this clear. The test is "which contact is the most significant
in a particular transaction.' ' a2 [Emphasis added.]
If a state generally has Blue Sky jurisdiction over sales of securities
made in such state, is it necessary for jurisdictional purposes that the
sale be entirely in the state, or is it enough that a substantial portion
of the sale transaction be in the state? Each of three separate lines of
reasoning demonstrates that the latter is enough.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that because of "the persistence
of the evil and its insidious forms""3 most states define the term "sale"
so broadly that any significant part of the sale transaction will ordi-
narily, by itself, be a "sale" within the meaning of the state Blue Sky
Law. Thus, California defines "sale" to include, among other things:34
[E]very disposition, or attempt to dispose, of a security . . . for value
.. whether done directly.. . or otherwise: An offer to sell; an attempt
to sell; a solicitation of a sale; an option of sale; a contract of sale; a
taking of a subscription; an exchange; any change in the rights, pref-
erences, privileges, or restrictions on outstanding securities.
Accordingly, the cases hold that the Blue Sky law may be violated
even though transfer of title to the shares or a "sale" within the law
of sales occurred only in another state.35
A sale of securities in violation of the Blue Sky law is a crime.3
A state ordinarily has jurisdiction over crimes where only a part thereof
was committed in the state, just as it does where the entire crime was
committed therein.37
Secondly, state courts have long exercised jurisdiction over acts
done or to be done outside the state which are part of a larger trans-
action which materially affects state interests. Three illustrative
examples follow:
a. One Hedley was manager of the Wells Fargo & Co. office at
Gold Hill, Nevada. Unknown to his employer he had lost money specu-
lating on the San Francisco Stock Exchange. Hedley, thereupon, sent
3 Richards v. U.S., 369 U.S. 1, 13 (1962).
3 See note 14 supra.
" CAL. CORP. CODE § 25009(a).
" Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 406, 414, 12 Cal. Rptr.
719, 729, 736 (1961) ; People v. Alison, 189 Cal. App. 2d 201, 205, 10 Cal. Rptr. 859, 864
(1961) ; People v. Rankin, 169 Cal. App. 2d 150, 325 P.2d 10 (1958) ; People v. Sears,
138 Cal. App. 2d 773, 791, 292 P.2d 663, 680 (1956).
36 E.g, CAL. CORP. CODE §§26103-04 (Maximum penalty for individuals $5,000 fine
and 5 years).
" E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 778(a).
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a telegram from Gold Hill, Nevada, to Wells Fargo & Co., San Fran-
cisco, California, directing it to pay a sum of money to Hedley's San
Francisco broker. The telegram contained a code word which advised
(untruthfully in this case) that Hedley on behalf of Wells Fargo
& Co. had received said sum from a customer for transmittal. Wells
Fargo & Co., in San Francisco, paid the sum to the broker. When
Hedley was later charged with embezzlement in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, he sought release on habeas corpus because he was in Nevada
when the embezzlement was alleged to have been committed in Cali-
fornia. His application for release from custody was denied.3"
b. A California shareholder in an Arizona corporation sought an
order from a California court that he might inspect the corporation's
gold mine located in Arizona. The directors resided in California and
generally held their meetings there. The lower court, believing it lacked
jurisdiction to order inspection of an Arizona mine owned by an
Arizona corporation, gave judgment for defendants. The California
Supreme Court reversed.39
c. A California court exercised jurisdiction to order persons who
controlled a Mexican corporation to cause that corporation not to
take action in Mexico which would impede the flow of water from
Mexico to California.40
Thirdly, it is axiomatic in securities cases that substance prevails
over form.41 The substance of most securities distributions is a two
way flow. On one hand there is a flow of money from the public to
the issuer for the purpose of supplying capital to the issuer (after costs
and selling expenses have first been deducted). On the other hand,
there is a flow of securities from the issuer to the public in exchange
for the public's money. If, therefore, money is flowing from citizens
of the state to an issuer in exchange for its securities, it appears that
the substance of the securities transaction is occurring in the state from
which the money is flowing despite the technicality that, within the
meaning of the law of sales, the sale may not have occurred entirely
in such state.4" If the substance of the transaction is looked to in
accordance with established principles respecting securities regulation,
then the state whose citizens are paying their money as part of this
5 8 Ex parte Hedley, 31 Cal. 108 (1866).
Hobbs v. Tom Reed Cold Mining Co., 164 Cal. 497, 129 Pac. 781 (1913); accord,
SEC v. Minas De Artemesia, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945).
40 Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cal. Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152 Pac. 542 (1915).
"' People v. Sidwell, 27 Cal. 2d 121, 128, 162 P.2d 913, 920 (1945).
42 "[T]he devices to avoid state regulation have been clever and calculated." Travellers
v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 653 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
flow would seem to have jurisdiction to establish Blue Sky regulation
to protect its citizens against imposition.
If, then, a state has Blue Sky jurisdiction over the sale of securities
of foreign corporations whenever a substantial part of such sale occurs
in the state, may the state properly define such a sale to include "any
change in the rights, preferences, privileges or restrictions on outstand-
ing securities"?"
Such a provision, added to the California code in 1945," confirmed
prior administrative interpretations.4 5 The validity of this provision,
which contains no exception for foreign corporations, does not appear
to have been questioned in any court. Even the Western Air Lines, Inc.
brief did not appear to challenge it.
This provision, of course, does not prohibit changes in outstanding
securities. It merely requires such changes to conform to the standards
of fairness which are required in the original sale of the securities
and thereby helps to achieve the regulatory purposes of the Blue Sky
law. It helps to maintain the integrity of what has been sold. Manage-
ments and promoters should not be permitted to play a shell game with
securities. What boots it that securities must be fair when sold if,
immediately after the money has been collected, they can be converted
into unfair securities?46
It is argued by some that this regulation is unnecessary because
changes in securities ordinarily may be made, under Delaware or
Nevada law for example, only by at least a majority vote of the share-
holders. Such an argument is not persuasive. In many cases the
promoters or management are in a position to directly control the vote
of a majority of the shares. In such cases the public shareholders
would be dependent on the "good nature""' of the promoters or manage-
ment as to how they will be affected by the changes. In those cases
where the promoters or management do not directly control a majority
of the votes, the shareholders, in voting on changes, are ordinarily
dependent on the management for information as to the proposed
" CAL. CORP. CODE § 25009(a). Such provision is "unique." SCHLEI, STATE REGULA-
TION OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL PRACTICES 28 (1961). A "substantial part" of any change
in securities apparently of necessity occurs in the state where the owners of the securities
reside. "Mobilia sequunter personam."
" Cal. Stat. 1945. Ch. 399 § 8. p. 854.
" See CAL. Ops. ATT'Y GEN., No. 5599, May 3, 1926.
" The Delaware statutes, for example, do not contain a "fairness" test in recapitaliza-
tions. See Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (1929).
" See notes 8 and 9 Supra.
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changes.4" The SEC regulations requiring annual and other reports
to shareholders and reasonable disclosure in proxy solicitations are
unfortunately limited, by statute, to companies with securities listed
on stock exchanges. Attempts in the Congress to extend these rules to
other companies have so far been successfully opposed by special
interests.49
There is another reason why the requirement of a shareholder vote
does not eliminate the need for Blue Sky regulation of changes in
securities. In the original distribution of the securities the people
who buy are primarily only those who consent to buy; i.e., those who
buy as a result of physical coercion, duress, and the like are believed
to be relatively few. There is, therefore, approximately 100 per cent
consent so far as the original purchasers are concerned. But such
consent is not evidence that Blue Sky regulation is unnecessary.
On the contrary, Blue Sky laws have been enacted primarily to protect
those who would consent.
The need for Blue Sky regulation of changes in securities is recog-
nized by legal scholars. It was the judgment of California's great legal
scholar in the corporation field that state Blue Sky regulation of
recapitalizations and reorganizations is essential for the protection of
investors :5"
A requirement that the fairness of the terms and conditions of such an
exchange be approved by some impartial administrative officer is a far
more effective method of regulation than the almost useless judicial
remedies which are afforded by a suit for injunction or by the compen-
sation of dissenting shareholders. In fact such regulation seems to offer
the only hope of preventing unfairness in such fundamental changes as
to which the shareholders do and must rely almost exclusively upon
representations made to them by the management of the issuer. (Em-
phasis added.)
Professor Dodd of Harvard:51
It may be that an extension of administrative control over recapitaliza-
tions by federal or perhaps state administrative agencies to other types
of corporations is the best possible solution to the recapitalization prob-
lem-one is tempted to say the best curb for the recapitalization racket.
"' BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 880-881 (Rev. Ed. 1943). "The value of securities con-
sists in what they represent, and to determine such value is a complex problem even to
the most skillful and informed." Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 552 (1917).
"' "[Elach time the Association has been effective in its opposition." ANNUAL REPORT,
NATIONAL AsSOCIATIoN SEcURiTiEs DEALERS, INC., 4 (1959).
'0 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 880-881 (Rev. Ed. 1946).
" Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalization, 55 H/Mv. L. REv. 780, 816 (1942).
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Emphasizing the need for investor protection:
[J]udicial control of recapitalization is of limited significance in
almost every state. 5
2
In view of the difficulties and expense faced by minority sharehold-
ers in seeking relief and the traditional reluctance of courts to interfere
in corporate affairs, solution of the freezeout problem may lie in the
use of an administrative agency. 53
To follow the argument of Western to its conclusion, would be to say
that the commissioner might have the power in the first instance to re-
quire certain rights to be guaranteed to shareholders before he would
permit the sale or issuance of a foreign corporation's stock in this state
but that, immediately thereafter by the device of amending the charter
of such corporation in another state, the entire structure of that corpora-
tion, even to substantial changes in the rights of shareholders in Califor-
nia could be legally effected. Such a holding would enable a foreign
corporation to destroy the rights which the State of California has
deemed worthy of protection by the enactment of the [Blue Sky Law] .54
After a detailed study of 15 years' operation of such Blue Sky
regulation of securities changes, an eminent scholar concluded that
"The result is a system in California which more effectively protects
security holders than have the courts in other states." 55
In view of the foregoing, it appears that a state may properly
conclude, and act on the conclusion, that its Blue Sky police power
includes the power to regulate changes in outstanding securities of
foreign corporations held by its citizens. A state is not impotent to
protect its citizens against sharp corporate practices by foreign cor-
porations.
Such regulation in its penal aspects appears subject, of course, to
the basic jurisdictional requirements that the person against whom
such regulation operates be either found in, or extraditable into, the
state.
The arguments against state Blue Sky jurisdiction over changes
in rights in securities of foreign corporations appear to fall under
two heads. One argument seems to be that such Blue Sky action is
vulnerable because it does not give full faith and credit to the law of
the state of incorporation.5" The other argument seems to be that, for
52 Note, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1030, 1047 (1958).
" Note, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1643 (1961).
" Western Air Lines, Inc., v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 413-414, 12 Cal. Rptr.
719,728 (1961).
" Orschel, Administrative Protection for Shareholders in California Recapitalizations,
4 STAN. L. REV. 215, 236 (1952).
""The question is almost entirely unexplored and anything said on the subject must
be in the nature of an opinion." Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs,
58 COLUm. L. REV. 1118, 1144 (1958).
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business reasons, it is desirable to have uniformity in the law governing
corporate securities and that therefore a state, other than the state of
incorporation, lacks jurisdiction to impose Blue Sky regulations on
changes in securities.57
The claim that a Blue Sky law regulating changes in securities does
not give full faith and credit to the foreign law appears doubtful for
several reasons. First, full faith need not automatically be given to
a law which is against the public policy of the forum state.5" The
public policy of the Blue Sky states is that their citizens are entitled
to Blue Sky protection. For Delaware or Nevada, for example, to
impose corporate practices of "easy virtue" on Blue Sky states would
apparently violate the latter's public policy. Delaware's, or Nevada's,
fiscal profit from credulous persons elsewhere" does not appear to
be thus constitutionally guaranteed. 0 Second, the argument proves
too much. The Delaware law and the Nevada law, by their terms, avoid
Blue Sky regulation in the initial sale of securities as well as in their
subsequent changes. (As previously shown, the power of the Blue Sky
states to regulate the initial offering is now unquestioned.) If it denies
full faith and credit to impose Blue Sky regulation on changes in
securities why does it not also deny full faith and credit to impose
Blue Sky regulation on the original sale, in other states, of securities
of Delaware or Nevada corporations?
The other argument against state Blue Sky jurisdiction appears to
be this: since it is desirable to have uniformity in the law regarding
securities, the law of the state of incorporation 6' must control as to
all matters relating to the corporation's securities and, therefore, a
state lacks jurisdiction to impose Blue Sky regulations which could
affect the validity of securities of foreign corporations.62
But while uniformity is desirable, here as in other fields, any
assertion that the constitution commands arbitrary uniformity and that
"Reese & Kaufman, supra note 56, at 1126.
'8 Alaska Packers v. Ind. Ace. Comm., 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
'o See note 21 supra.
'o "[T]he conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and
credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statute to those of
the other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning
the scale of decision according to their weight." Alaska Packers v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 294
U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
"
t But see, Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 173 (1955): "[Alnd
other legal systems have long rejected the notion that the law of the chartering state
automatically governs. Instead, there must be legal compliance with the law of the place
where the corporation has its 'social seat.'"
"Reese & Kaufman, supra note 50, at 1144. See also Note, 46 MiNN. L. REv. 785
(1962).
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it be achieved in one particular way appears unsupportable. Further-
more, the legitimate desire for uniformity must not be perverted into
a Trojan Horse with which to destroy other states' standards of corporate
conduct. If Delaware and Nevada could give the law to the rest of the
land that result could soon follow although, of course, it might thereby
lessen Nevada's and Delaware's revenue dependence on gambling.
In addition, this uniformity argument also apparently proves too
much. Blue Sky laws, such as California's, may declare securities
sold in violation of such laws to be void. 3 (In practical effect the
word "void" means voidable at the option of the purchaser.") If such
a provision is proper, as apparently it is, with respect to the original
sale of securities, then why is it improper when applied to changes in
securities in violation of a state Blue Sky law?
If, in recapitalizations, all states must subordinate their public
policies to the law of the state of incorporation (which might be Dela-
ware or Nevada) we must frankly recognize that this would enable
"a foreign corporation to destroy the rights which the State of Cali-
fornia has deemed worthy of protection.""3  Such a blow to state
authority appears flatly contrary to what the Supreme Court has said
about state Blue Sky regulation. 6
At the present time if a corporation wishes to sell its securities
it ordinarily must comply with the Blue Sky laws of each state where
it sells (as the word "sell" is defined in each Blue Sky law.) If its
shares have preemptive rights it presumably must comply with the
Blue Sky law of every state in which its shareholders reside (and make
them an offer) before it can sell additional shares. If the corporation
wishes to grant stock options to its executives it presumably must first
comply with the Blue Sky law of each state in which its executives
reside. If the corporation wishes to establish a profit sharing or pension
plan for employees, particularly if, as a part thereof, the employees
contribute towards the purchase of the company's shares, it ordinarily
must comply with the Blue Sky law of each state in which its employees
reside. The various Blue Sky laws have exemptions and some of the
above transactions may be exempt in some states, but apparently the
states have Blue Sky jurisdiction in each of the above matters.
"3 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 26100.
"Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under California Corporate Securities Act,
34 CALIF. L. REV. 544, 554 (1946).
"o Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 413-414, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719.
729 (1961).
", "The state must adapt its legislation to evils as they appear, and is not helpless
because of their forms." Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 588 (1916).
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In each of the above situations uniformity of state action ordinarily
appears desirable. In each case fears of chaos and the like could be
apprehended from conflicting or arbitrary state actions. Yet state Blue
Sky jurisdiction is not seriously questioned.
Lack of jurisdiction, of course, cannot be founded on any fears
that the Commissioner would act arbitrarily.6"
Where uniformity in state Blue Sky regulation appears desirable
it can generally be achieved. Since the objectives of Blue Sky laws
are much alike, the administrators often voluntarily adopt similar
approaches.6" When a securities issue is being offered in more than
one state it is not unusual for administrators to pool information.
Statements of policy are agreed to by administrators in conventions
which, while not legally binding, are intended to help achieve uniformity
of treatment. 69 Securities administrators throughout the United States
consciously try to ease the path of legitimate business in every way which
is consistent with the protection of investors and the due administration
of law.
It has been asserted by some that such uniformity often means that
the company must comply with the Blue Sky laws of the toughest state.
But even if that were true, which is not always so, is that less prefer-
able than the alternative, i.e., under the guise of "uniformity" to
comply with no Blue Sky laws if the promoters "happened" to
incorporate in Nevada or Delaware? And can the latter view be raised
to the dignity of a constitutional command?" °
Let us examine the uniformity argument from a different angle.
A given corporation has securities outstanding which were sold in
compliance with the local Blue Sky laws. All is uniform. Someone
wants to change the securities. Until the change is made, all is still
uniform. If application is made in compliance with local Blue Sky
laws applying to changes in securities, the same problems may arise
as when the securities were originally sold, or when rights offerings are
made shareholders, or options granted executives, or investment plans
offered employees. In each case counsel must convince the commis-
sioners that the proposal is fair. But if the proposal is fair, that can
" "Besides, we repeat, there is a presumption against wanton action by the Commis-
sion, and if there should be such disregard of duty a remedy in the courts is explicitly
given, and if it were not given it would necessarily be implied." Merrick v. Halsey & Co.,
supra note 66, at 590.
"8 A recently adopted uniform form of application to sell securities (Form U-1) is
acceptable in many states, for example.
" Sobieski, State Securities Regulations of Real Estate Investment Trusts, 48 VA. L.
REv. 1072 (1962).
" See note 66 supra.
be done. Last year, the California Division of Corporations, for
example, issued over 18,000 permits, in each case finding, among
other things, that the proposed offering was fair.
Since the objectives of all state Blue Sky laws are much the same,
relatively few cases should arise in which the commissioner in one
state would require things which a commissioner in another state would
forbid. The obvious step, if that ever did occur, would be to arrange
a telephone conference between the commissioners. If their conflicting
attitudes could not be resolved, and if it was felt that a state was acting
arbitrarily, we would appear to have a proper case for judicial review.
It can be assumed that the judiciary can capably solve, on an individual-
ized basis, any few such interstate conflicts as cannot administratively
be taken care of.7
No basis for lack of state Blue Sky jurisdiction exists because
"mechanical formulae," or alleged need for uniformity, appears
present. Furthermore, the question in such rare cases like those when
a state's refusal to permit the original sale of securities is challenged,
would appear to be whether the state exercised its jurisdiction arbi-
trarily, not whether it had jurisdiction. In making such a determination
a prime consideration would apparently be the basic fairness or unfair-
ness of the proposed change. If the fairness, as general Blue Sky
standards measure fairness, were at all doubtful it is difficult to see
how the position of the objecting state could be overcome.
A serious problem can arise, however, if management, without
complying with the local Blue Sky laws, purports to change securities.
In such a case are the changes valid? Many awkward questions can
arise but one point seems clear. The purpose of the Blue Sky laws is to
protect investors. If such laws can be circumvented by the simple
device of not complying and then pointing to the difficulty of unscram-
bling the mess caused by non-compliance, there would be a loophole
which is really colossal.
This article will conclude with a brief analysis of the issue which
3' The resolution of such conflicts presumably would involve "the balancing of all the
interests of the states with the most significant contacts." Richards v. U.S., 169 U.S. 1, 13
(1962). Also, "appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the
scale of decision according to their weight." Alaska Packers v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 294 U.S.
532, 547 (1935).
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triggered the Western Airlines case: cumulative voting." More elabo-
rate discussions can be found elsewhere.73
The merit-or vice, depending on one's viewpoint-of cumulative
voting, which has been mandatory for ordinary California corporations
since 1879, is that it permits representation of minority shareholders
on the board of directors. This touches basic principles. According to
J. S. Mill, "it is an essential part of democracy that minorities be
adequately represented." '74
Assume a corporation with only five shareholders, each owning
one share. If there were five directors then, under cumulative voting,
each shareholder could always elect one director. Under straight voting,
however, three of the shareholders, if they wished, could always elect
all of the directors thereby excluding 40 per cent of the shares from
representation on the board.
A director, in addition to his other powers, usually has almost
unlimited right of access to corporate records and information.75
It could hardly be otherwise if he is to properly exercise his duties as
a director. In the case above, the owners of 40 per cent of the shares
are not only excluded from representation on the board, but they are
excluded from the full corporate information which directors are
entitled to have. They see, on the other hand, at least two directors
with no investment in the company enjoying the power and emoluments
of directorships.
In the case above, the owners of 60 per cent of the shares elect
100 per cent of the directors. Suppose the board enters into a contract
with corporation "A", which is 100 per cent owned by members of
the board. The directors stand to gain 100 per cent of the profits
of "A" while, in the given corporation, 40 per cent of any loss will be
borne by shares which are unrepresented on the board. In some
corporations the directors may own few shares but still control the
proxy machinery as officers. In such cases it can appear to be to their
short range personal advantage if the corporation they direct, and in
which they have but a small stock interest, enters into an unprofitable
'" CAL. CORP. CODE § 2235: "Every shareholder entitled to vote . . . may cumulate his
votes and give one candidate a number of votes equal to the number of directors to be
elected multiplied by the number of votes to which his shares are entitled, or distribute his
votes on the same principle among as many candidates as he thinks fit."
" See Sobieski, In Support of Cumulative Voting, 15 Bus. LAw 316 (1960). For an-
other view, see Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. LAw 550
(1961).
"JOHN STUART MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1861).
"E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 3001. His right to inspect corporate books, properties, etc.,
is "absolute." CAL. CORP. CODE § 3004.
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contract with another corporation in which they have a more substantial
stock interest.
In larger corporations the need for cumulative voting appears even
more acute. There the management, through control of the corporate
proxy machinery, may become "an autocratic self-perpetuating oli-
garchy. 17  When corporate salaries, fringe benefits, stock options,
possible conflict of interest transactions and the like arise, how can a
board properly act when the board itself may be subject to dismissal
whenever the management decides to use the proxy machinery differ-
ently? In passing on such important and delicate questions, how is it
possible to compare a director who owns a few or no shares, craves the
fees and prestige of his directorship, and who knows his tenure as
director depends on management's good will toward him, with a director
who is elected by cumulative voting, who owns or represents a large
number of shares, and who is secure in his directorship regardless of
whether he votes against a stock option for the corporate president?
These crucial problems are appreciated by some managements.
In some corporations, very large stockholders sit on the board. Some
boards have a salary and bonus committee made up in large part of
elder members who presumably can take a detached view of these
delicate problems. Such voluntary procedures, effective though they
may be in particular cases, do not appear to be required by law and
certainly they are not followed by all corporations.
A solution which the law can impose is cumulative voting. Through
it one or more "independent directors," to use Lewis D. Gilbert's
felicitous words, can be elected who would not be obligated to manage-
ment for appointment or tenure. Is not the possibility of electing
"independent" directors through cumulative voting a desirable develop-
ment if we wish corporate integrity to rest on a more substantial base
than good intentions? On the other hand where management in effect
selects all of the directors we have the tail wagging the dog.
Arguments against cumulative voting fall under two heads. In the
hearings conducted prior to adoption of voting rules under the Cali-
fornia Blue Sky law77 it was argued by counsel that a director who
owned few shares was, on principle, "better" than a director who was
a large shareholder. The latter, it was asserted, was interested in his
shares, the former in the good of the corporation. This argument, it
seems, is contrary to all experience. It is not in accord with the
Holy Writ which says that where a man's treasure is, there also is his
heart.
BERLE, ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 9 (1957).
10 CAL. ADmA. CODE § 367.
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It was argued that shares which cannot elect directors are never-
theless "represented" by all the directors who, of course, owe a legal
duty to all shareholders. That appears to be a play on the word
"represents." Having a director who owes you such legal duties as you
can enforce in courts is materially different from having a director
whom you have chosen.
It was argued that directors elected by cumulative voting would
act for the shareholders who elected them, while directors elected by
the management's proxy machinery would represent "all" the share-
holders. One management asserted in its proxy statement that, "Cumu-
lative voting may open the way for partisanship among board members
and for special interests to obtain board representation." This is a
form of the "papa knows best" argument. To have board members
who own or represent enough shares to be elected under cumulative
voting means directors with a real stake in the company. If the basic
assumptions of capitalism are sound, that is superior to a "harmonious"
board subject to dismissal by the group controlling the proxy machinery.
It is argued that cumulative voting must be undesirable because
many corporations do not have it. The answer to this is, regrettably,
that many promoters and managements still try, to the extent the law
permits, to get as great personal latitude as possible and to give the
shareholders as little power as can conveniently be arranged.
The distinguished financial editor of the San Francisco Chronicle,
Sidney P. Allen, has said:7"
[I]t will no longer do to hide behind the old Wall Street notion that
there's really no parallel between democracy in government and democ-
racy in corporations .... The courts of the land . . . recognize that
corporate democracy is a real part of our life. And they are not ready
to permit minority rights like cumulative voting to be short circuited.
Cumulative voting in corporations is supposed to have been started
by the great Joseph Medill, of Chicago, an early backer of Abraham
Lincoln. Writing in support of the proposal to put cumulative voting
for directors into the Illinois Constitution of 1870 (it was placed in
the California Constitution in 1879), Medill wrote: "It can do no harm.
It will certainly do an immense amount of good. It is in the right direc-
tion-in the direction of honesty and of protection to the property, and
the interests of shareholders in private corporations."7
7 Investment Dealers Digest, June 5, 1961.
'
0 GILBERT, STOCKHOLDER ACTIVITIES AT CORPORATION MEETINGS 184 (1961).
